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A rapidly growing literature documents that 
the quality of service delivery in many 
developing countries – particularly in health 
and education – is poor (Chaudhury et al. 
2006, Das and Hammer 2014, Das, Holla, et 
al. 2016, Mohanan et al. 2015). Among the 
large number of interventions aiming to 
improve service quality, three distinct types of 
approaches have emerged. The first, and most 
traditional, emphasizes improving provider 
skills (through training, for example) and 
increasing resources available to them (Das, 
Chowdhury, et al. 2016). A second approach 
emphasizes increasing and redirecting effort 
among existing service providers.  This 
approach, focused on aligning incentives 
within principal-agent frameworks, has 
received considerable recent attention in 
economics and emphasizes the use of overt 
incentives (Ashraf, Bandiera, and Jack 2014, 
Björkman and Svensson 2009, Deserranno 
2016). In contrast to the second, the third 
approach instead emphasizes selecting 
workers and service providers with desirable 
attributes related to good performance (a 
common practice in industrial psychology, for 
example) (Ashraf, Bandiera, and Lee 2016, 
Dal Bó, Finan, and Rossi 2013, Finan, Olken, 
and Pande 2015).  Little is known about how 
the second and third interact.  In this paper, we 
study how agents respond to performance 
incentives according to personality traits – 
with potentially important implications for 
both approaches. In doing so, we use data 
from a field experiment in which maternity 
care providers in rural India were offered 
financial incentives for improving maternal 
and neonatal health outcomes. 
I. Background 
The use of performance incentives in health 
care systems in developing countries is 
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widespread (see Finan, Olken, and Pande 
(2015) and Miller and Babiarz (2014) for 
reviews).  In a broader project studying 
performance incentives among maternity care 
providers in India, we randomly assigned 
providers to either an incentive or a control 
group. Performance incentive group providers 
achieved post-partum hemorrhage (PPH) rates 
– the leading cause of maternal mortality 
worldwide – that were 20 percent lower than 
those in the control group (Mohanan et al. 
2016).  
Personality traits – defined as patterns of 
thoughts, feelings, and behavior that predict 
how individuals respond to circumstances 
(Roberts 2009) – have drawn attention from 
economists because of their potential as stable 
traits that influence performance directly 
(Almlund et al. 2011, Bowles, Gintis, and 
Osborne 2001, Cubel et al. 2016). A canonical 
approach to measurement of personality traits 
is the “Big Five” factor model.1 Among the 
five traits, we focus on Conscientiousness and 
Neuroticism because previous literature has 
found them to be consistently correlated with 
educational and labor market outcomes 
(Borghans et al. 2008, Heckman, Stixrud and 
Urzua 2006, Heckman and Rubinstein 2001). 
Conscientiousness is associated with 
                                                
1
 See Almlund et al. (2011) for an excellent summary of Big Five 
personality traits and applications in recent economics literature.  
dependability, organization skills, 
perseverance, and achievement oriented 
thinking.  Neuroticism – the converse of 
emotional stability – is associated with 
anxiety, worry, anger, and insecurity. With 
recent evidence showing that personality traits 
play a role in the performance of health 
service providers (Callen et al. 2015), we 
explore how behavioral response to financial 
incentives interact with these two key traits. 
II. Experiment, Data and Methods 
Our field experiment, conducted in 
Karnataka, India, tested the effectiveness of 
performance incentives offered to solo-
practice obstetric providers to improve 
maternal and child health outcomes (post-
partum hemorrhage (PPH), sepsis, pre-
eclampsia, and neonatal mortality) among the 
provider’s patients.  We focus on 53 providers 
randomized to incentive contracts based on 
health outcomes and 44 control group 
providers.  Both types of providers received 
guidelines of the World Health Organization 
(WHO) and Government of India for best 
practices in maternity care, signed agreements 
to participate in the study, and were informed 
about data collection procedures. The 
contracts in the performance incentive arm 
also specified payments for achieving low 
rates of adverse health outcomes. For further 
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details of the overall study design, data 
collection protocols, timelines, and results, see 
Mohanan et al. (2016). 
We collected survey data both from women 
delivering babies with participating providers 
and from providers themselves. Each new 
mother was surveyed within approximately 
two weeks of birth, providing information 
about childbirth, obstetric history, and 
maternal and neonatal health. Our provider 
surveys included measures of hospital 
infrastructure, as well as provider 
characteristics (education, training, and 
experience – and the Big Five personality 
inventory).2 
We estimate the effect of incentive contracts 
on PPH and how they vary by personality 
traits using the following general estimating 
equation: 
(1) 𝑃𝑃𝐻!" = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑇! +  𝛿𝑃! + 𝜆𝑇! 𝑥 𝑃! +𝜃𝑋! +  𝛾𝑍! + 𝑠! + 𝜉!+ 𝑢!", 
 
where 𝑃𝑃𝐻!" is an indicator of PPH incidence 
for woman i who received care from provider 
p, 𝑇!is an incentive group indicator, 𝑃!  is the 
score of a  personality trait (conscientiousness 
or neuroticism),  𝑋!  is a vector of provider 
                                                
2
 We interviewed providers using a shortened version of the full 
Big Five Inventory (BFI), the BFI10 (Rammstedt and John 2007), and 
also included additional questions from a 12-adjective instrument that 
was piloted and tested in the Study of the Tsunami Aftermath and 
Recovery (STAR) project in Indonesia. 
characteristics, 𝑍! is a vector of time-invariant 
maternal characteristics (including age, 
education status, religion, and birth history), 𝑠!  and 𝜉!  represent district and enumerator 
fixed effects. The key parameter of interest is 
the 𝛽 + 𝜆 ∗ 𝑃! . 
III. Results 
Our simple randomization of providers into 
incentive and control arms appears to have 
produced a balanced sample (see Appendix). 
Figure 1 then shows the distribution of 
conscientiousness and neuroticism among 
providers in the control and incentive contract 
arms. Most providers exhibit high levels of 
conscientiousness and low levels of 
neuroticism – and the distribution of each is 
heavily skewed.  
[Figure 1] 
Table 1 shows estimates obtained by 
estimating regression (1).  Because the 
outcome is an individual mother’s incidence 
of PPH, an adverse health outcome, negative 
coefficient estimates reflect better provider 
performance. The first column shows that 
more conscientious providers perform better. 
The coefficients for the incentive contract 
variable and its interaction with 
conscientiousness are statistically different 
from zero implying that the beneficial effect 
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of the incentive is weaker among more 
conscientiousness providers (who, absent 
incentives) do relatively better). 
[Table 1] 
To help interpret estimates from our 
regressions, we also report differences 
between the 25th and 75th percentiles of 
conscientiousness: For providers in the 25th 
percentile of conscientiousness (scoring 4.3 
out of 5), the incentive contract decreases the 
PPH risk by 13.3 percentage points, whilst it 
is not statistically significant for those in the 
75th percentile (scoring 5 out of 5). At mean 
levels, the incentive contract reduces PPH risk 
by 6.25 percentage points. 
The second column then considers 
neuroticism and its interaction with the 
incentive contract.  Although some studies 
report that neuroticism is associated with poor 
performance, we do not observe this 
association in our sample of health care 
providers (column 2 of Table 1). However, 
performance gains with incentives are 
amplified among more emotionally stable 
providers (those with low values of the 
neuroticism scores). For providers in the 25th 
percentile of neuroticism (scoring 1.25 out of 
5), the incentive contract decreases the PPH 
risk by 13 percentage points, whilst it is not 
statistically significant for those in the 75th 
percentile with scores of 2.25. At mean levels 
of neuroticism, the incentive contract reduces 
PPH risk by 7.44 percentage points. 
We find that providers with high 
neuroticism do not improve their performance 
with incentive contracts. This finding could be 
consistent with the “choking under pressure” 
hypothesis, according to which individuals’ 
performance deteriorates due to over-arousal 
and distraction that accompany high stakes 
(Ariely et al. 2009, Baumeister 1984, Yu 
2015). 
IV. Conclusion 
We present evidence on how two 
personality traits – conscientiousness and 
neuroticism, which are consistent predictors of 
performance  – influence the effectiveness of 
performance incentives on maternal health 
outcomes. Our results also contribute to a 
growing body of empirical research on the 
importance of worker selection suggesting that 
selection strategies must be deliberate about 
the work environments and embedded 
incentives in which they are being used. Such 
strategies could be improved with further 
tailoring the personality traits that they target.  
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FIGURE 1. DISTRIBUTION OF CONSCIENTIOUSNESS AND NEUROTICISM AMONG CONTROL AND TREATMENT PROVIDERS  
 
 
 
 
TABLE 1 — INTERACTION BETWEEN PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES AND PERSONALITY TRAITS 
  Post-partum Hemorrhage 
Panel A: Regression Results  (1)  (2) 
  Coefficient     (SE)  Coefficient     (SE) 
Incentive  -1.133*** (0.284)  -0.255*** (0.079) 
Conscientiousness  -0.193*** (0.057)    
Conscientiousness X Incentive  0.231*** (0.063)    
Neuroticism     -0.0329 (0.039) 
Neuroticism X Incentive     0.0997** (0.048) 
Panel B: Linear Combination Results 
 
Conscientiousness  
 
Neuroticism 
Treatment + interaction at P25  -0.133*** (0.032)  -0.130*** (0.032) 
Treatment + interaction at mean  
 
-0.063** 
 
(0.032) 
 -0.074** (0.031) 
Treatment + interaction at P75  0.021 (0.045)  -0.031 (0.044) 
N  1993   1993  
R-sq  0.297   0.296  
Dep Var Mean  0.364     
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Both columns include provider and patient level controls as well as 
district and enumerator fixed effects.  Conscientiousness and Neuroticism are measured through provider 
surveys. 25th and 75th percentiles: (Conscientiousness: 4.3 and 5) and (Neuroticism: 1.25 and 2.25) 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
 
 
 
